The “Commitment Trap” Revisited: Experimental Evidence on Ambiguous Nuclear Threats

Journal article

Michal Smetana, M. Vranka, Ondřej Rosendorf
Journal of Experimental Political Science, 2023

Cite

APA Click to copy
Smetana, M., Vranka, M., & Rosendorf, O. (2023). The “Commitment Trap” Revisited: Experimental Evidence on Ambiguous Nuclear Threats. Journal of Experimental Political Science.

Chicago/Turabian Click to copy
Smetana, Michal, M. Vranka, and Ondřej Rosendorf. “The ‘Commitment Trap’ Revisited: Experimental Evidence on Ambiguous Nuclear Threats.” Journal of Experimental Political Science (2023).

MLA Click to copy
Smetana, Michal, et al. “The ‘Commitment Trap’ Revisited: Experimental Evidence on Ambiguous Nuclear Threats.” Journal of Experimental Political Science, 2023.

BibTeX Click to copy

@article{michal2023a,
  title = {The “Commitment Trap” Revisited: Experimental Evidence on Ambiguous Nuclear Threats},
  year = {2023},
  journal = {Journal of Experimental Political Science},
  author = {Smetana, Michal and Vranka, M. and Rosendorf, Ondřej}
}

Abstract

In this paper, we provide an empirical test for the theoretical claim that ambiguous nuclear threats create a “commitment trap” for American leaders: when deterrence fails, supposedly they are more likely to order the use of nuclear weapons to avoid domestic audience costs for backing down. We designed an original survey experiment and fielded it to a sample of 1,000 U.S. citizens. We found no evidence of a commitment trap when ambiguous nuclear threats are made. Unlike explicit threats, ambiguous ones did not generate domestic disapproval when the leader backed down; the decision to employ nuclear weapons led to more public backlash for the leader than being caught bluffing; and the threats did not influence public preference for nuclear use across our scenarios. Our findings contribute to the scholarly literature on nuclear crisis bargaining and policy debates over the future of US declaratory policy.